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COMMENT
THE ART OF WAR: THE PROTECTION OF
CULTURAL PROPERTY DURING THE "SIEGE"
OF SARAJEVO (1992-95)
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the night of August 25, 1992, shells from Serb
gunners fell on the National and University Library of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in Sarajevo. The attack set off a blaze fueled by a
collection representing hundreds of years of Bosnian history and
culture. Librarians and community members, risking sniper fire,
formed a human chain to move books to safety.' Despite
emergency efforts, ninety percent of the collection was ash by
daybreak.2  Unfortunately, this incident was not unique. The
destruction of cultural artifacts during the "Siege" of Sarajevo was
a loss not only to Bosnia,3 but also to the heritage of the world
which now suffers a gap that cannot be closed.
"Traditional" warfare, or battle between sovereign states, is
becoming less common. Increasingly, conflicts are erupting
between different ethnic or religious groups whose cultures, while
clashing, are intricately linked. The cases of the former
Yugoslavia and, more recently, the reign of the Taliban in
Afghanistan, show that aggressors are not necessarily motivated by
the acquisition of land, resources, and power. Instead, the aim is
increasingly to raze all evidence of an inconvenient past in order to
clear the way for a rewritten cultural narrative.
This was certainly the case in the former Yugoslavia where the
widespread destruction of Bosnia's multiethnic cultural heritage
was the result of deliberate targeting by Serb forces that flouted all
international humanitarian law. As Andis RiedImayer,
bibliographer at the Harvard University Fine Arts Library, says,
1. Ramona Koval, The Sarajevo Haggadah, BRICK, Winter 2002.
2. Id.
3. Unless otherwise noted, "Bosnia," "Bosnia-Herzegovina," and "Bosnia
and Herzegovina" all refer to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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"in Bosnia and Herzegovina, rubble signifie(d) national extremists
hard at work to eliminate not only human beings and living cities
but also to erase all memory of the past."4
This purposeful destruction is the new reality of cultural
property5 protection.
However, most of the effort in this field is based on outdated
notions of warfare and reflects an optimism that international law
4. Andrds Riedlmayer, Bosnia's Multicultural Heritage and Its Destruction,
Address Before the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (May 2, 1994),
at http://www.kakarigi.net/manu/ceip2.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2002).
5. In this examination, the definition of "cultural property" established in the
1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict will be used. The three categories encompassed in this
definition are:
Movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural
heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or
history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of
buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of
art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or
archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important
collections of books of archives or of reproductions of the property
defined above;
Buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the
movable cultural property, defined in subparagraph (a) such as museums,
large libraries and depositories or archives, and refuges intended to
shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property
defined in subparagraph (a);
Centers containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in
subparagraphs (a) and (b), to be known as 'centers containing
monuments."'
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, art. 1, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, 242
[hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention]
Sometimes a distinction is made between "cultural property" and "cultural
heritage," with the former only encompassing material objects and the latter
meaning the intangible (folklore or skills, for example). This study, however,
deals exclusively with the physical. Therefore, when the term "heritage" is
used, it is acting as a synonym for "property" and refers to tangibles like books,
artworks, monuments, and buildings. See Markus M. Mifller, Cultural Heritage
Protection: Legitimacy, Property, and Functionalism, 7 INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 395, 396 (1998).
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will ultimately prevail. This may happen yet but, until then, there
must be much more focus on practical aspects of protection. This
article uses the case study of Sarajevo6 during the War in the
former Yugoslavia to critically examine the effectiveness of
current cultural property protection efforts. After providing some
background on the philosophy behind cultural property protection
in Section II, this article will examine the 1954 Hague Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict (Hague Convention), its shortcomings, and its application
to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Section III will examine
the extent and nature of cultural destruction during the War and the
experience of cultural institutions in Sarajevo. This information
was gathered from interviews conducted in Sarajevo with museum
directors and cultural leaders in January 2003. The efforts of the
United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), which is the primary inter-governmental organization
(IGO) charged with protecting cultural property will be examined
in Section IV. The effectiveness of outside aid from other
international organizations will then be discussed in the fifth
section. Section VI summarizes the actions of other international
organizations during cultural warfare. This article concludes with
recommendations for improving protection efforts, and provides a
basis for re-envisioning the existing paradigm of how cultural
property is protected in times of crisis.
II. PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY
Invariably, the first objection to focusing on cultural heritage
protection during armed conflict is that resources should not be
diverted from more pressing humanitarian issues. Choosing
between saving lives and a building is a clear decision. However,
6. There are many case studies that could be used to illustrate the destruction
wrought during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, including Dubrovnik,
Mostar, and Kosovo. This study will bring in supporting examples when
appropriate, but aims for depth (rather than breadth) by primarily using the
example of actions taken in Sarajevo - a city under siege for over three years
(1992- 1995).
2004]
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cultural symbols are the manifestation of a society's beliefs and
history and are an essential element of national and ethnic identity.
During war, purposeful "widespread destruction has the painful
virtue of enlarging notions of the heritage to all objects in which a
people see carried the values of their culture, however new or old,
however outstanding or run-of-the-mill these objects are."7 The
destruction of cultural property is a very effective psychological
tool because:
if heritage is effectively destroyed that is a loss for all
groups, and it becomes an act of rewriting history - in the
mono-ethnic direction, a means of suppressing the past, and
depriving people of the tools for understanding it. It also
annihilates pride (there is nothing more to show).8
Cultural property protections "recognize the intimate
connectedness between humans and the objects they produce, and
the deep values and symbols people imbue in material culture."9
In this way, they protect people as well as their material culture. °
The importance of cultural identity is also embodied in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which contains the
provision that "everyone has the right to freely participate in the
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits."'" Unquestionably, a link
7. Colin Kaiser, War Damage to the Cultural Heritage in Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. No. 6756 (1993), 13. This
report was the first of its kind produced during the war.
8. E-mail from Colin Kaiser, UNESCO Representative in Sarajevo, to Megan
Kossiakoff, author (Feb. 25 2003, 11:52:58 CST) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Email from Colin Kaiser].
9. Chip Colwell-Chantaphonh & John Piper, War and Cultural Property:
The 1954 Hague Convention and the Status of U.S. Ratification. 10
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 217, 226 (2001).
10. Frank G. Fechner, The Fundamental Aims of Cultural Property Law, 7
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 376, 378 (1998).
11. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N.
GAOR, at art. 27 (1948), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html
(last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
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exists between heritage destruction and human rights violations
because "where human rights are not respected, cultural property
is usually not protected. The reverse holds true as well -
destruction of the cultural heritage often means an attack on
culture and cultural identity as well."12 The goal of protecting the
cultural heritage during a conflict involving ethnic cleansing is to
keep the anchors of a society in place, and to deprive the aggressor
of the opportunity to change history. It becomes a form of
resistance that builds on more traditional humanitarian
interventions, which offer only survival. Jakob Finci, the
President of Sarajevo's Jewish organization, La Benevolencija, put
this well when he said that "art is something human, even in the
worst situations, it's important to preserve a human face."' 3
III. LEGAL PROTECTIONS: THE HAGUE CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED
CONFLICT (1954)
Most of the effort in cultural property protection is directed at
bringing the combined pressure of the international community to
bear on offenders through international law, which has the
potential "normative power to shape common understandings of
what is right and wrong."' 4 Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648,
warring parties have made provisions to safeguard each other's
property.'5  These protections evolved slowly to confront the
12. Mfiller, supra note 5, at 405.
13. Interview with Jakob Finci, Head of the Jewish Community of Sarajevo,
in Sarajevo, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Jan. 21, 2003) [hereinafter
Finci].
14. Miiller, supra note 5, at 400.
15. JIRu TOMAN, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF
ARMED CONFLICT: COMMENTARY ON THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND ITS
PROTOCOL, SIGNED ON 14 MAY 1954 IN THE HAGUE, AND ON OTHER
INSTRUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING SUCH PROTECTION 5
(Dartmouth Publishing and UNESCO 1996). The Peace of Westphalia, which
ended the Thirty Years War, provided that looted objects should be returned to
their place of origin. Id.
2004]
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challenges posed by increasingly destructive methods of warfare. 6
During the course of World War II, however, it became clear that
stronger laws urgently needed to be developed to prevent such
widespread destruction from happening again.
At the beginning of the Second World War, the governments of
Germany, France, Poland, and the United Kingdom gave their
assurances that non-military targets would not be purposely
attacked. 7 These rules of engagement, which were established at
President Roosevelt's behest before the United States entered the
war, were followed to a remarkable degree during the first years of
battle. 8 This ended in March 1943, when the British test-bombed
the historic and undefended German city of Lfibeck. 9 Britain's
move signaled a change in attitude for all parties involved.
Cultural property became "fair game" as claims of "military
necessity" now became applicable to almost all targets.
The resulting widespread destruction of cultural heritage during
World War II provided a powerful impetus to develop
comprehensive international laws that were strong enough to
ensure that such devastation would not happen again. To this end,
on May 14, 1954, thirty-seven states signed "The Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict," which evolved out of earlier legal codes and the
lessons learned from the wars of the twentieth-century's first half.
This Convention maps out not only how belligerent forces should
respectfully treat cultural property during conflict, but also the
measures that must be taken by defending nations to ensure that its
cultural property does not become a legitimate target. Its
applicability is mostly limited, however, to conflicts involving
16. For example, during World War I there were challenges enforcing the
1907 Hague Convention, which was the precursor to the 1954 Hague
Convention, because military technology was not sufficiently advanced to
prevent collateral damage. Id. at 14.
17. Patrick Boylan, Review of The Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague Convention of 1954),
UNESCO, at 32-33, UNESCO Doc. CLT-93/WS/12 (1993).
18. Id. at 34.
19. Id. at 35.
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conventional weaponry. Even with its drawbacks, it is the most
complete agreement for the protection of the cultural heritage
during armed conflict to date.
All parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia were parties2"
to the 1954 Hague Convention, thus responsible for its
implementation. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
ratified the 1954 Hague Convention on February 13, 1956 .and
entered it into force on August 7, 1956. After the disintegration of
the Yugoslav state began in 1991, the resulting nations succeeded
to the Convention. It did not need to be separately re-ratified.2' On
April 27, 1992, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which
encompassed Serbia and Montenegro (the two states remaining in
the union), informed the Director-General of UNESCO that "it
would strictly abide by all the international obligations which the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had assumed in the
past.' '22 After declaring independence, the Republic of Croatia
succeeded to the Convention on July 6, 1993. 23 The Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina's succession followed the next day, July 7,
1993. Thus, all parties involved in the conflict were under an
obligation to adhere to the Convention in its entirety.24
20. A state becomes a signatory when it indicates an intent to ratify a
convention by signing it. However, a signatory is not bound by the convention
until it ratifies or accedes to it. When it does so, it becomes a "member state" or
"party" to the Convention. E-mail from Patty Gerstenblith, Professor, DePaul
University College of Law, to Megan Kossiakoff, author (Sept. 6, 2003,
14:10:22 CST) (on file with author).
21. W. Hays Parks, The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Address Before the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (May 2, 1994), at
http://www.kakarigi.net/manu/ceip4.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2002).
22. Toman, supra note 15, at 451-52.
23. Id. at 449.
24. There is some overlap between the 1954 Hague Convention and Article
53 of Protocol I (for international conflicts) and Article 16 of Protocol I
(relating to non-international conflicts and civil disputes) of the Geneva
Conventions. Even States that have not signed the 1954 Hague Convention, but
have ratified the additional protocols of the Geneva Convention, are bound to
respect protected cultural heritage. However, they are not required to follow the
specific procedures for enforcement outlined in the Hague Convention. The
2004]
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According to a United Nations Commission of Experts that
investigated the situation in the former Yugoslavia, both the 1954
Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention and Protocols were
applicable in the conflict." However, as Hays Parks, Chief of the
International Law Branch of the Office of the Judge Advocate
General of the Army during the war in the former Yugoslavia,
says:
Most law - whether it is domestic or international, is
negotiated or promulgated on the basis that it will assume
that most people are law-abiding, and that there are. good
reasons for adhering to it ... the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia shows perhaps the worst of what people can do
when they are bent on mischief. The law seldom is going to
provide protection against the lawless. And that is one of the
dilemmas that we have here.26
There was much discussion during the conflict about the
applicability of the Hague Convention. In a 1995 report on its
application of the Hague Convention, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia wrote that "the real answers to the question of how the
Geneva Convention Protocols contain no reference to a waiver of protection for
military necessity - a major point of contention in the Hague Convention. In
addition, Article 53 of Protocol I to the Geneva Convention, protects places of
worship, regardless of their cultural "value." Article 85 of Protocol I defines a
"Grave Breach" to Article 53 as the willful destruction of property. This is
significant because it provides an additional recourse to prosecute the
destruction of cultural property as a war crime if perpetrators are not parties to
the Hague Convention.
The 1954 Hague Convention adopted Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention
which defines the bounds of protection beyond the generally accepted definition
of war, thus including armed conflicts, civil wars, independence efforts, etc.
This has become increasingly important in the last few decades when the world
has seemingly seen more "untraditional" than "traditional" conflicts. Boylan,
supra note 17, at 43.
25. Destruction of Cultural Property Report, Interim Report of Commission
on Experts, U.N. SCOR, Annex 11, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2 (Vol. V)
(1993).
26. Parks, supra note 21, at 1.
116
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Hague Convention was applied can be best got if we ask how it
was not applied, and even better, how it was abused."27 How, and
to what extent, the Convention was applied shows its
shortcomings. For this reason, several of its main provisions and
how it was applied in this conflict will be examined in depth.
A. Main Provisions of the 1954 Hague Convention
1. Peacetime Preparations
Parties to the 1954 Hague Convention are required to make
peacetime preparations to safeguard cultural property before the
potential for a conflict arises.28 However, only the training and
instruction of the military regarding the appropriate treatment of
cultural property is specified in the Hague Convention. According
to Article 7, military units should include cultural heritage
specialists and be prepared to cooperate with cultural workers in
the field.29  Enforcing this provision would require that an
infrastructure for cooperation between the military and cultural
community be established in advance of any conflict.
Outside of this military measure, specific regulations for
preparation were not included in the final version of the
Convention. Examples of possible safeguards could include the
establishment of safe shelters ("refuges"), the organization of
transport for endangered property, and the establishment of a
civilian service to carry out protection duties." However, Parties
have the discretion under the Convention to decide what
preparation in peacetime entails and which properties are to be
27. Information on the Implementation of the Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event ofArmed Conflict, at 25, UNESCO Doe. CLT-
95/WS/13 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Implementation Reports].
28. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 5, 249 U.N.T.S. at art. 3.
29. Id. at 249 U.N.T.S. at art. 7.2.
30. For examples of preparatory measures undertaken by countries, see
Boylan, supra note 17, at 71-73.
2004]
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protected.3" UNESCO is available for guidance on technical
matters and to assist with organization. 2
In general, peacetime preparations in Sarajevo were
inadequate.3 While basement storage was often made available,
the removal of objects was generally delayed until the situation
became critical. In many cases, this was too late. The
psychological shift needed to accept the possibility of war seemed
too difficult to make until it became an unavoidable reality. Serb
authorities asserted that the provisions of the Convention
specifying respect for cultural property were integrated into the
regulations of the former JNA (Yugoslav People's Army) and that
a series of lectures were organized for soldiers.34
2. Special Emblem
The designation of a distinctive emblem to identify cultural
property was first discussed at the Brussels Conference of 1874.
Article 17 of the "International Declaration Concerning the Laws
and Customs of War," which was the unratified treaty written at
the Conference, refers to the responsibility of a besieged party to
"indicate the presence of such buildings (churches, hospitals, and
buildings dedicated to art, science or charitable purposes) by
distinctive and visible signs to be communicated to the enemy
beforehand."35  Subsequent conventions relating to cultural
property protection contained similar provisions. 6
31. Toman, supra note 15, at 97.
32. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 5, 249 U.N.T.S. at art. 23. Under the
1954 Hague Convention, UNESCO is not required to specifically earmark funds
to assist countries in developing preparatory programs. Toman, supra note 15, at
64. This funding oversight was addressed in the 1999 Second Protocol. See
discussion infra Section III (C)
33. See infra Section IV.
34. 1995 Implementation Reports, supra note 27, at 25.
35. Toman, supra note 15, at 177.
36. The 1935 Roerich Pact, which was ratified in 1935 by the United States
and most countries in North and South America, adopted an emblem consisting
of a red circle encompassing three smaller circles on a white background for
identification purposes. See Toman, supra note 15, at 18.
118
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Article 16 of the 1954 Hague Convention adopts an emblem that
"shall take the form of a shield, pointed below, per saltire blue and
white (a shield consisting of a royal-blue square, one of the angles
of which forms the point of the shield, and of a royal-blue triangle
above the square, the space on either side being taken up by a
white triangle)." This emblem, which is simpler in appearance
than this description might lead one to believe, was chosen after
extensive visibility experiments.38 The implementation of this
Article is left to the discretion of competent officials appointed by
the Parties to the 1954 Convention.39 So far, only Germany,
Austria, the Netherlands, and Switzerland have provided details on
measures taken to implement the emblem." While the efforts of
these nations are commendable, these countries are relatively
stable and not considered likely future war zones.
In Sarajevo, the use of the special emblem was the Hague
Convention provision most visibly enforced. The blue shields
designating protected cultural property were provided to Sarajevo
cultural organizations by the Museum Documentation Center in
Zagreb (Croatia). A 1996 European Community Monitoring
Mission note that, "unfortunately, these provided no protection."4
During the war, heavy fortifications were often necessary to
protect the physical integrity of buildings. This was the case at the
National Museum, where a barrier was erected in front of the main
entrance on Vojvode Putnika Street ("Sniper's Alley"). This
fortification gave the impression that the building was being used
for military purposes. The current Museum Director noted that, "in
37. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 5, 249 U.N.T.S. at art. 16.1.
38. Toman, supra note 24, at 181.
39. Regulations for the Execution if the Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, art. 20
[hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention Regulations].
40. Toman, supra note 15, at 187.
41. Lopez Henares, Ninth Information Report on War Damage to the
Cultural Heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, EUR. PARL. ASSEMB.
Doc. No. 7464, sec. 3 (1996), http://assembly.coe.int (last visited Aug. 13,
2003). Council of Europe documents that were accessed from the Internet will
refer to section numbers, rather than providing page references, to facilitate
future access.
2004]
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this way, the UNESCO flag [displaying the special emblem] at the
Museum entrance [lost] its original meaning" because it could be
perceived as a legitimate military target by attacking forces.42
3. Special Protection
Article 9 of the Convention grants immunity to cultural property
under special protection unless that property is used for military
purposes. If a party violates any of the conditions established for
this select status, immunity will be revoked.43 Special protection,
as opposed to the "regular" protection afforded to other cultural
objects and sites, is available to property of "very great
importance."" Each Party is left to act on its own interpretation of
"importance" as the Convention itself does not define this term
Article 12 of the "Regulations for the Execution of the
Convention"45 establishes an international register of cultural
property under special protection. The framers of the 1954 Hague
Convention hoped that a well-defined procedure for registering
property under special protection and disclosing its location would
eliminate the potential excuse of ignorance by a hostile party.
Only refuges specifically constructed to house movable property,
monument centers, and other immovable property can be included
on the international register. As a prerequisite for inclusion on the
special protection registry, property must be an "adequate
42. Denana Buturovic, The National Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina -
Its Emergence and Its Fall in the Overall Destruction of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (From April 1992 to the End of 1995), in WISSENSCHAFTLICHE
MITTEILUNGEN DES BOSNICH-HERZEGOWINISCHEN LANDESMUSEUMS 7, 24
(2000).
43. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 5, 249 U.N.T.S. at art. 11.
44. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 5, 249 U.N.T.S. at art. 8.
45. "The Regulations for the Execution of the Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict" are the sections of the
1954 Hague Convention concerned with the more technical aspects of
implementation. Among other subjects, they discuss aspects of organization,
special protection registration, transport of cultural property, and the use of the
distinctive emblem. See 1954 Hague Convention Regulations supra note 39,
249 U.N.T.S. 240.
120
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distance" from industrial or military centers.46 However, the term
"adequate distance" is left undefined, and this omission has caused
confusion.
As framed in the 1954 Convention, the concept of "Special
Protection" is vexingly vague. It does not necessarily grant a
higher level of protection to property on the register. Instead, it
merely ensures that registered property is not being used for
military gain. The meaning of this distinctive status has been
questioned when, without being a safe distance from the action,
even the most important museums in the world are excluded from
protection.47
The international register of property under "Special Protection"
as outlined in the 1954 Hague Convention has had very little
impact so far. 8  Only Germany, Austria, Cambodia, the
Netherlands, and the Holy See have asked for property to be added
to the Register.49 One of the reasons for this may be a shift in
priorities to the 1972 World Heritage Convention, which is
intended to protect both important cultural and natural heritage."
46. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 5, 249 U.N.T.S. at art. 8. This
article states that special protection is available provided that properties of "very
great importance":
1 a)are situated at an adequate distance from any large industrial center or
from any important military objective constituting a vulnerable point...
lb) are not used for military purposes.
A refuge for movable cultural property may also be placed under special
protection, whatever its location, if it is so construed that, in all
probability, it will not be damaged by bombs.
3)A center containing monuments shall be deemed to be used for
military purposes whenever it is used for the movement of military
personnel or material, even in transit. The same shall apply whenever
activities directly connected with military operations, the stationing of
military personnel, or the production of war material are carried on
within the center. Id.
47. A shortcoming noted by Patrick Boylan in his 1993 study. See Boylan,
supra note 17, at 76.
48. Toman, supra note 15, at 109.
49. Id. at 108.
50. The purpose of this Convention is to preserve the natural and cultural
heritage that has universal value to all people. Parties to the 1972 World
2004]
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Another reason is that providing the location of and access routes
to a nation's most valuable treasures during a potential armed
conflict is seen as not only dangerous, but foolish as well. 51
Practical experience has done nothing to alleviate these fears.
Though never registered for Special Protection under the 1954
Hague Convention, the locations of emergency shelters in
Yugoslavia were registered with the National Defense Department.
When Vukovar, Croatia fell to Serb forces in November 1991,
shelters housing important artifacts were identified from official
records by Serb forces. They reportedly captured the objects as
prize and removed them to Belgrade. 2
4. Immunity
Article 14 of the Hague Convention states that protected cultural
property is immune from "seizure, placing in prize, or capture. 53
This means that hostile forces cannot legitimately claim property
unless it is being used for military purposes. Personnel charged
with protecting cultural property are to be "respected" and
permitted to continue doing their work. 4
During the Wars in the former Yugoslavia, allegations were
made that Serb forces were in violation of this provision of the
Convention as they were not only specifically targeting cultural
property for destruction, but also looting important pieces from
museums.5 According to a 1995 report on the implementation of
the 1954 Hague Convention, Serb authorities countered that "there
was not a single example of targeted and deliberate destruction or
damage of a cultural and historical monument similar to the
Heritage Convention pledge to protect the world heritage sites within their
territory by registering their most important sites to the World Heritage List. For
more information on the 1972 World Heritage Convention, see
http://whc.unesco.org/nwhc/pages/doc/main.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
51. Boylan, supra note 17, at 78.
52. Id. at 78-79.
53. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 5, 249 U.N.T.S. at art. 14.
54. Id. at art. 15.
55. See infra Section IV for specific examples of these allegations.
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spectacular destroying of the Old Bridge in Mostar by the Croatian
forces before the eyes of the entire world."56 Accusations of Serbs
looting movable property were dismissed as a "dirty form of
propaganda."57 Instead, they asserted that removal had, in fact,
been sanctioned by an expert commission established by the
Republic of Serbia which had been given the mandate, as a result
of requests from local authorities, to move endangered cultural
property to safety (i.e. Serbia). 8 According to this report, the
sanctions levied against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its
suspension from international organizations, including UNESCO,
made it impossible to "give an objective evaluation of the
professional approaches and efforts made to mitigate the
consequences of the war on cultural heritage."59
5. Enforcement
In the 1954 Hague Convention, "Protecting Powers," who are
traditionally called upon to watch over the interests of the parties
to a conflict, are to apply the Convention and its regulations in
cooperation with the parties.6" The appointment of Protecting
Powers is supposed to be accomplished through channels of
complementary international laws, specifically the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961 (Article 46)
or the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 1.61 This
has rarely happened. To date, "[enforcement of the Convention] is
all anticipation, since present policy clearly shows that States have
little enthusiasm for the application of a control system [which
might affect their sovereignty]. '62 According to Article 2 of the
"Regulations for the Execution of the Convention: Organization of
Control," Parties involved in an armed conflict are to "appoint a
56. 1995 Implementation Reports, supra note 27, at 26.
57. Id. at 27.
58. Id. at 26-27.
59. Id. at 27.
60. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 5, 249 U.N.T.S. at art. 21.
61. Toman, supra note 15, at 224.
62. Id.
2004]
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representative for cultural property."63  In addition, Protecting
Powers are to appoint delegates who monitor violations, conduct
necessary investigations, and inform the Commissioner-General of
any violations.6' Included in the Commissioner-General's duties is
the commissioning of reports on the Convention and
communication with the Parties and their Protecting Powers.65 In
addition, he has the power to order investigations66 and to act as a
Protecting Power, should one not be appointed.67 In short, he is
responsible for ensuring that the process moves along and
intervenes if problems arise.
Attempting to explain this enforcement structure can only be
easier than actually implementing it because "in practice, it is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make progress with the
formal procedures of the Convention where one or both of the
belligerents declines to nominate Protecting Powers."68  In only
one historical case, the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967, was a
Commissioner-General for cultural property even appointed.
Outside parties do not, realistically, have the moral or political
authority to impose such a representative.69 In situations where
there are not two well-defined sovereign states involved, 7 Article
23 of the Convention, "Assistance of UNESCO," has been more
effective. This provision allows for the intervention of UNESCO
through a Special Representative of the Director-General.7
During the course of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992 -
95), a Protecting Power was not appointed to safeguard the
interests of the belligerent states. This may have been the result of
63. 1954 Hague Convention Regulations, supra note 39, 249 U.N.T.S. at art.
2.
64. Id. at art. 5. This Commissioner-General is to be appointed by the
Director-General of UNESCO.
65. Id. at art. 6.5.
66. Id. at art. 6.3.
67. Id. at art. 6.6.
68. Boylan, supra note 17, at 85.
69. Id. at 87.
70. One example being the former Yugoslavia where the distinctions
changed as the conflict progressed.
71. Boylan, supra note 17, at 87-88.
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confusion caused by the fact that the conflict began as internal and
became international as the States declared independence.
However, because the government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (or at this time, the remaining states - Serbia and
Montenegro - in the former entity of "Yugoslavia") did not
recognize the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia, the
appointment of a Protecting Power "would presumably [have
been] a fruitless exercise."72
B. Criticisms of the 1954 Hague Convention For The Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event ofArmed Conflict
The Hague Convention, though it offers a framework for
responsible commanders, is of little use in the increasingly
common situation where an attacker wishes specifically to destroy
the other side's cultural identity. Nor does it help when, as
happened in the Gulf War, the defending commander uses
precious monuments as hostages by parking his military
installations as close to them as possible.73
Non-traditional warfare, in which no standards of acceptable
behavior are followed, has become increasingly prevalent since the
framing of the 1954 Hague Convention. In conflicts like the one
in the former Yugoslavia, destruction of cultural property is a goal
- not an unavoidable tragedy. Although it is the most
comprehensive agreement to date, the 1954 Hague Convention
does not adequately address the purposeful destruction of heritage.
In his 1993 review of the Convention, cultural consultant Patrick
Boylan points out that "the problem is essentially one of failure in
the application of the Convention and Protocol rather than of
inherent defects in the international instruments themselves."74 To
date, the Convention has been invoked in several conflicts,
72. Boylan, supra note 17, at 86. Boylan also notes here that it was "not
clear whether either Croatia or Bosnia had attempted to initiate the appointment
of Protecting Powers." Id.
73. Amy E. Schwartz, Is It Wrong to Weep for Buildings?, WASH. POST, May
10, 1994, at A17.
74. Boylan, supra note 17, at 7.
2004]
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including the conflict in 1969 between Honduras and El Salvador,
the conflict in 1971 between India and Pakistan, the conflict in
1974 between Cyprus and Turkey, during the 1970s in Cambodia
and Thailand, during the 1980s in the Middle East, the 1991
Persian Gulf War, and the 1991 - 1995 conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia.75 There are some significant problems that continue
to plague the Hague Convention's enforcement on a more
universal basis.
The major criticism of the Hague Convention is lack of
enforcement. Much of the problem is that it leaves State Parties to
largely implement its provisions under the "Honor System." In
addition, the specified control structure is extremely complicated
and too idealistic for the political reality. Most Parties have not
made sufficient provisions to prepare in peacetime. While the
Second Protocol aims to correct this deficiency, the concept of
"military necessity" still only requires that Parties,
make an effort whenever circumstances permit to notify the
opposing party within a reasonable time in advance of the
decision to withdraw immunity. In short, this clause
essentially relieves any State Party of its responsibility to the
Convention so long as it determines the 'necessity' to do
SO.
7 6
C. The 1999 Second Protocol
In response to concerns about the effectiveness of the 1954
Hague Convention, a conference was called in 1998 to frame an
additional, separately acceded to protocol applicable to both
international and non-international conflicts. It is scheduled to
enter into force on March 9, 2004. 7" Because the Second Protocol
was only written in 1999, it is not directly related to discussions
about the conflict in Bosnia. However, its adoption, albeit by
75. Colwell-Chanthaphonh & Piper, supra note 9, at 228.
76. Id. at 229-30.
77. See http//:www.unesco.org for updates.
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relatively few parties at the present time, demonstrates how
cultural property law protection is evolving to meet present
challenges. Five topics were revisited for clarification and
strengthening in the 1999 Second Protocol: military exception,
protective measures, special protection, individual responsibility,
and "institutional aspects."" The first four will be discussed here.
1. Military Exception
One of the main weaknesses of the 1954 Hague Convention is
the vagueness of the term "military necessity." To clarify what
"military necessity" entails, a definition of the term was prepared
by the Secretariat of UNESCO in 1998." 9 Military necessity is
78. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, New Rules for the Protection of Cultural
Property in Armed Conflict, 1999 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS
No. 835, 593, available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList 174/DFE2EF4C9BO65770C 1
256B66005D898C.
79. Jan Hladik, The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the Notion of Military Necessity:
The Review of the 1954 Convention and the Adoption of the Second Protocol
Thereto (26 March 1999), 1999 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS
No. 835, 621, available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/iwpList174/FF7F81319BI F96DAC 12
56B66005D8A96. The definition of "military necessity" in respect to cultural
property under general protection is:
1) Measures undertaken by a military commander to obtain, as quickly as
possible, the complete surrender of the enemy must be lawful and in
conformity with the generally recognized principles of international
humanitarian law, both of treaty and customary nature, such as the
distinction between combatants and non-combatants, proportionality and
the prohibition of reprisals against protected categories of persons and
objects.
2) Those actions must be limited as to the time, purpose, and object of
military operations.
3) No other feasible alternative was available at the moment of the
operation.
4) The assessment of the situation by a commander was made from all
sources reasonably available to him/ her at the moment of the operation.
5) Imperative military necessity may be established only by the officer
2004]
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clarified in the Second Protocol by stating that "imperative" means
that there are no other options available to achieve a particular
military objective.8" Article 4 of the Second Protocol states that
cultural properties will be subject to targeted attack only when "by
their function, [they] have been made into military objects" or
there is "no feasible alternative available to obtain a similar
military advantage."'" The decision to target cultural heritage can
only be made by a commanding officer in charge of a battalion (or
its equivalent).82
2. Peacetime Preparation
The Second Protocol calls for the establishment of an inter-
governmental committee that will oversee implementation of the
Convention and its protocols.83  While the original 1954
Convention did not define peacetime measures, the Second
Protocol gives specific examples in Article 5. These include the
preparation of inventories, the establishment of emergency
procedures, and the designation of "competent" authorities. To
address the issue of financing this preparation, Article 29 of the
commanding a force the equivalent to a battalion unless the
circumstances of the military engagement do not allow this.
6) If possible, a warning shall be communicated to the opposing party a
reasonable time in advance.
Military necessity in respect of cultural property under special protection:
In addition to the six conditions listed under a), the following two
conditions must also be respected.
1) Unavoidable military necessity may be established only by the officer
commanding a force equivalent to a division.
2)A warning shall be communicated to the opposing party in a
reasonable time in advance. Id.
80. Henckaerts, supra note 78.
81. Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, March 26, 1999, art. 6, at
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php@URLID=15207&URLDO=DOTOPIC&
URLSECTION=201.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2004)[hereinafter Second
Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention].
82. Id.
83. Id. at art. 24.
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Second Protocol provides for the establishment of a fund
specifically for this purpose (much like the one for the
implementation of the World Heritage Convention).84 In addition,
the Second Protocol attempts to codify education on the
Convention by specifying the need to incorporate cultural property
concerns into military training.85
3. Enhanced Protection
In an attempt to overhaul the concept of "Special Protection,"
the 1999 Second Protocol basically redefines it under a new name.
It is now known as "Enhanced Protection." Enhanced Protection
still requires that cultural property is not used for military
purposes, but only excludes inclusion on the international register
on the basis of how it is being used. The troublesome "adequate
distance" requirement was thrown out. Eligibility for this
designation requires that a site "be protected by adequate domestic
legal and administrative measures recognizing its exceptional
cultural and historic value and ensuring the highest level of
protection." In addition, the State Parties must declare that the
cultural property in question will not be used for military
purposes.6 The term "Enhanced Protection" is misleading because
the difference between regular and enhanced protection is not in
the degree of care that must be afforded by the enemy, but in the
commitment of the property holder to never use the most
important heritage within its borders for military advantage. A
more appropriate designation would be "Certified Protection."87 If
a party decides to use a site on the Enhanced Protection list for
military purposes, that party may face criminal indictment for war
crimes."
84. Id. at art. 29.
85. Id. at art. 30.
86. Id. at art. 10.
87. Henckaerts, supra note 78.
88. Id.
2004]
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4. Criminal Prosecution and Individual Responsibility
The Second Protocol also goes further than the original
Convention in establishing a system for the prosecution of crimes
against culture, which only required that Parties undertake criminal
prosecution "within the framework of their ordinary criminal
jurisdiction."89 This provision was not very useful for prosecution
or deterrence because it did not specify the violations that would
carry a criminal sanction.9" Article 15 of the Second Protocol
establishes that if cultural property protected under the Convention
is the object of attack, used in support of military action, or
subjected to theft, pillaging, or vandalism,91 such an action would
constitute a grave breach of international law and subject a violator
to criminal proceedings. Under the Second Protocol, Parties have
a duty to ensure that there is legislation in place that would make
the offenses listed in the Protocol punishable under domestic law.92
89. "The High Contracting Parties undertake to take, within the framework
of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps to prosecute and
impose penal or disciplinary sanctions upon those persons, of whatever
nationality, who commit or order to be committed a breach of the present
Convention." 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 5, 249 U.N.T.S. at art. 28.
90. Henckaerts, supra note 78.
91. Id. Article 15 of the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention
specifically prohibits:
a) Making cultural property under enhanced protection the object of
attack.
Using cultural property under enhanced protection or its immediate
surroundings in support of military action.
Extensive destruction or appropriation of cultural property under the
Convention and (the Second) Protocol.
Making cultural property protected under the Convention and (the
Second) Protocol the object of attack.
Theft, pillage or misappropriation of, or acts of vandalism directed
against, cultural property protected under the Convention. Second
Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 81, art. 15.
92. Henckaerts, supra note 78.
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IV. SARAJEVO DURING THE, WAR
A. Background to the Cultural Destruction in Sarajevo
For many people, the War in the former Yugoslavia was
extremely complicated and difficult to grasp. This is because:
at various times, (a) the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY), which was succeeded on 29 April 1992
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), was engaged
in armed conflict against one or more of its neighbors:
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina; (b) Croatia was
engaged in armed conflict against the SFRY, the "Republic
of Serbian Krajina," the FRY, and Bosnia-Herzegovina; (c)
the latter was engaged in armed conflict against the SFRY,
the FRY, the Republika Srpska (Serbian Republic), Croatia,
the HVO (the Bosnian Croat entity), and the Bosnian
Muslim faction controlled by Fikret Abdic; and (d) Slovenia
was engaged in armed conflict with the SFRY.93
In certain ways, the situation's complexity is a consequence of
the region's position at the intersection of Christian Europe and the
Muslim East. When the Yugoslav State was created after World
War I, the country's three largest nationalities - Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes - had distinctly different histories, religions, cultural
traditions, and social structures.94  There was considerable
influence in Bosnia from the other republics,95 particularly
93. William J. Fenrick, The Application of the Geneva Conventions by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 1999
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS No. 835, 317, available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList173/6666B5AE 1 CDD5696C I
256B66005DOE5B (last visited July 11, 2003).
94. Ivo J. Lederer, Nationalism and the Yugoslavs, in NATIONALISM
EASTERN EUROPE 396, 397 (Ivo J. Lederer & Peter F. Sugar, eds., University of
Washington Press 2d ed. 1994) (1969).
95. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and
2004]
23
Kossiakoff: The Art of War: The Protection of Cultural Property during the "S
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ.ART. &ENT.LAW [Vol.XIV: 109
Catholic Croatia and Orthodox Serbia. For its part, Bosnia-
Herzegovina became part of the expanding Ottoman Empire in the
mid-fifteenth century when the Ottoman armies brought to the
region the Islamic religion and cultural influences of the Empire.96
This history is reflected in the strong presence of bazaars,
mosques, mahalla districts, and other hallmarks of Ottoman
architecture in the region.97 In 1878, Bosnia was absorbed into the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the years before the First World
War, civic buildings were erected according to the prevailing
Viennese tastes.98  Powerful regional identities were de-
emphasized when the republics joined together to form the
Yugoslav State in 1918, particularly under the leadership of Josip
Broz Tito (end of World War II until his death in 1980).9'
However, the inherently unstable union would not survive the
sweeping changes that came through the region with the end of
communism. In the absence of strong federal leadership,
nationalist and regional tensions were allowed to flair.
The Yugoslav Federation began to splinter apart when Slovenia
and, then, Croatia declared independence in 1991. The conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina began on April 5, 1992, after it declared
independence from Yugoslavia. Before the start of the war,
Bosnia was forty-three percent Muslim, thirty-five percent
Orthodox Serb, and eighteen percent Roman Catholic Croat.' °
Sarajevo was a modem city whose cultural landscape reflected a
rich tradition of tolerance and diversity. As Riedlmayer points out:
Buildings are intentional structures. They do not appear at
random. When you have a city that does not have separate
religious quarters, as neither Sarajevo nor Mostar did, and
when you have houses of worship located next to each other,
Slovenia made up "Yugoslavia."
96. Riedlmayer, supra note 4.
97. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. No. 6756, supra note 7, at 12.
98. Riedlmayer, supra note 4.
99. Lederer, supra note 94, at 397.
100. See Samantha Power, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL:" AMERICA AND THE
AGE OF GENOCIDE 247 (2002).
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it is an indication that people are willing to live with each
other. So their structures, being next to each other, are not
acts of challenge, but rather statements of coexistence. If
they couldn't stand the sight of each other, they would have
built out of sight of each other.'
The commingling of architectural heritage made it more difficult
for belligerent troops to specifically target certain sites. Thus,
when damage reports produced during and after the war note that
there was much more destruction to the Islamic cultural heritage, it
is clear that it was not accidental. According to a September 20,
1993 report commissioned by the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, nine hundred mosques were destroyed and five
hundred and fifty seriously damaged in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the
first year of fighting. Included in these numbers are twenty
mosques dating from the sixteenth century. 2
There were two main types of destruction during the war: 1)
damage from military operations. 2) the purposeful removal of
cultural property (looting) for useable materials or, more sinisterly,
so as to discourage the populace from returning to-their homes."3
Mortar, rocket launchers, and heavy artillery caused most of the
damage done in Sarajevo during the war."° Outside of Sarajevo,
Dubrovnik, Mostar, and Vukovar, there were more frequent
occurrences of dynamiting and burning ("the simpler means of
ethnic and cultural cleansing.") °5
The resources available to cultural organizations during the
conflict were greatly affected by the political upheaval caused by
101. Riedlmayer, supra note 4.
102. Colin Kaiser, Third Information Report on War Damage to the Cultural
Heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. No.
6904 (1993), at 6.
103. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB., Doc. No. 6756, supra note 7, at 14.
104. Id.
105. Colin Kaiser, Sixth Information Report on War Damage to the Cultural
Heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. No.
7133, Sec. F (1994), at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http%3A%2F%2Fdocuments%2Fworkin
gDocs%2Fdoc94%2FEDOC7133.htm.
2004"1
25
Kossiakoff: The Art of War: The Protection of Cultural Property during the "S
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ.ART. &ENT.LAW [Vol.XIV: 109
the quick transition from a communist system that held very
distinct groups in a federation to nationalistic states aiming for
homogeneity."6 In theory, the protection of cultural property in
Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be overseen by a central, national
body in the capital city of Sarajevo, with support provided by
regional and local offices. This was the case in Croatia, where a
well-organized cultural infrastructure was in place. °7 However,
there is little evidence that a similar infrastructure was an actuality
in Bosnia-Herzegovina.' A museum could be under the authority
of several different governmental bodies (republic, district, or city)
depending on its location and purpose. Confusion as to which
authority cultural organizations were accountable to during the
transitional period was evident."9 Moreover, the government
organizations that existed for the protection of culture had the
same difficulties operating under wartime conditions as the
organizations they were supposed to be helping. For example,
Farhad Mulabegovic, Deputy-Director of the Federal Institute for
the Protection of the Cultural and Natural Heritage of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, reported that his organization had no funding for
publications, supplies or equipment. Their library was
inaccessible to them because it was located in Serb-controlled
territory. They, too, were desperate for contact with foreign
colleagues."'
Given the desperate humanitarian situation during the conflict,
the national and local government bodies were not able to allocate
resources to "soft" concerns like art and culture."' The 1954
106. Often in discussions about the disintegration of Yugoslavia, ethnic
tensions are cited as a reason for the violence. Strictly speaking, this is not true.
Genetically, there is no difference between a Serb, Croat, and Bosniak. The
basis for differentiation is religious and cultural.
107. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB., Doc. No. 6756, supra note 7, at 13. With the
exception of a few well-publicized examples like Dubrovnik, Croatia had a
more successful experience protecting cultural property.
108. Id.
109. EUR. PAR. ASSEMB. Doc. No. 7464, supra note 41, at Sec. 2.
110. EUR. PAR. ASSEMB. Doc. No. 7133, supra note 105, at Sec. C.
111. EUR. PAR. ASSEMB. Doc. No. 7464, supra note 41, at Sec. 2. Kaiser
notes in this report that the UN Office of the Special Coordinator's Plan for
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Hague Convention envisioned that protection would be a joint
effort between international bodies, national governments, and
cultural professionals. In this case, the national government was
not capable of protecting the heritage. UNESCO, charged with
overseeing the implementation of the Hague Convention, was
noticeably absent. This left cultural administrators and a few
international organizations with the daunting responsibility for
protection and little political backing.
During the hostilities, the European Community Monitoring
Mission (ECMM) found security in museums to be poor. Part of
the reason for this was that alarm systems could not function
without electricity and broken windows were covered only in
plastic, if at all." 2 According to expert reports, most, if not all, of
the museums in Sarajevo were poorly equipped in modern
museum practices before the war."3 Computerized systems for
record keeping were not in place."4 Despite the long-term heavy
bombardment of the city, it is remarkable that only two museums
were completely destroyed - the Museum of the XIV Olympic
Winter Games and the Museum of the Sarajevo Assassination (of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand)."' Most others received serious
damage that compromised or destroyed parts of their collections.
Seven years after the Dayton Peace Accord was signed, the
destruction caused during the "siege" continues to influence
working conditions. For example, climate control continues to be
inadequate and some of the galleries still need to be repaired
before works can be moved out of storage.
"Restoring Life to Sarajevo" did not include significant planning for cultural
heritage. Eur. Parl. Assemb., Doc. No. 7133, supra note 105, at Sec. C.
112. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB., Doc. No. 7464, supra note 41, at Sec. 2.
113. Id. at Sec. 4.2.
114. Id. at Sec. 2.
115. Id. at Sec. 4.2.
2004]
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B. The Experience of Cultural Organizations in Sarajevo 116
The observations and efforts of museum employees are often
excluded from discussions of cultural property protection.
However, their experience shows the shortcomings of the current
protection model and the real challenges faced in the war zone.
For this reason, the work of cultural organizations will be
discussed in some detail here.
1. Umjetnicka Galerija Bib - National Gallery of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Founded in 1946, the National Gallery's collection contains
approximately 4,500 objects, mostly by Bosno-Herzegovinian and
Yugoslav artists. When the war broke out on April 6, 1992,
several museum staff members and neighbors, who had become
refugees, moved into the galleries and acted as a security force.
Gallery Director, Meliha Husedzinovic, believes that this move
prevented widespread looting. Throughout the Siege, volunteers
116. Interviews with directors of cultural organizations were conducted in
Sarajevo, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on January 2 0 th and 21 ' 2003.
The subjects of these semi-structured interviews were Meliha Husedzinovic,
Director of the National Gallery of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muhiba Kaljanac,
Director of the Historical Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Jakob Finci,
Head of the Jewish community of Sarajevo and President of La Benevolencija.
Subjects were chosen for their experience, their willingness to be interviewed on
this topic, and their availability during the short interview period. Interpretation
was provided by Asja Mandic, a curator at ARS AEVI (The Contemporary Art
Center of Sarajevo). Because English was not the first language of interview
subjects, special care was taken to clarify responses in order to ensure that
answers and wording were not influenced by bias. Interview answers were hand
recorded. In addition to in-person meetings, an interview with Colin Kaiser, the
current UNESCO representative in Sarajevo who served as a cultural consultant
to the Council of Europe during the war, was conducted via electronic mail.
Because he did not join the UNESCO office in Sarajevo until 1996, his
comments were primarily based on his personal views and experience
conducting fact-finding missions during the War. An e-mail discussion also
took place with Nermina Zildzo, an artist who volunteered with the Commission
for the Protection of Cultural Heritage.
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ran the institution because the Gallery's curatorial staff atrophied
from nine to three. Before the war began, several Serb gallery
guards organized a burglary of icons and other valuable works
from the collection before abandoning their posts. The
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe fact-finding
mission put this theft at forty icons, two Hodler paintings, and an
unknown quantity of Islamic manuscripts." 7 When fighting broke
out, the collection was immediately moved into a basement storage
space. From 1993 through the end of the War, the Gallery
functioned and produced exhibitions like the renowned,
"Witnesses of Existence," which showed works by Bosnian artists.
Husedzinovic's major concern during the War was for the
building. The rain gutters were destroyed by bullets, which
allowed water to stream down the walls, making the galleries very
wet and humid." 8 The building's humidity control was dependent
on electricity, which was not on during most of the war. This
damage could not be repaired because of a lack of supplies and the
obvious danger involved.
In Husedzinovic's opinion, the enforcement of the 1954 Hague
Convention would not have "done much good" in this case. In
1993, window coverings were provided to the gallery by
UNPROFOR, but this was the only outside assistance that the
Gallery received during the course of the war. She believes that
outside aid would have been helpful, particularly in providing
better conditions in the basement storage area.
2. Historijski Muzej Bilt - The Historical Museum of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Founded in 1945 as the "Museum of the People's Liberation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina," the Historical Museum assumed its
current name in 1993. The collection, which was in good
condition before the war, currently contains over 300,000 objects
117. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. No. 7464, supra note 41, at Sec. 4.1.
118. Husedzinovic notes that it took a year for the walls to dry out after the
War.
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from the time of the Slovenes' arrival in the seventh century to the
present time. Before the War, the Museum's staff numbered forty,
nine of whom were curators. This number was reduced to two
curators and eight total employees during the conflict. When the
War broke out, no official plan for preserving the collection was in
place. Staff members immediately started moving it into the
basement, which is also where they did their work. The Director,
Muhiba Kaljanac, says that they did what they could, and that even
if there had been a plan in place, the conditions probably would
not have allowed them to properly carry it out. Soldiers were sent
to provide security for the collection.19
There were also psychological barriers to accepting the reality of
war. Kaljanac notes that nobody believed that the war was
happening or that it would go on for so long. The museum
building is located on Vojvode Putnika Street (now "Zmaja od
Bosna"), which was the front line of the conflict. This road was
known to the world as "Sniper's Alley" during the war.
Undoubtedly, this was one of the most dangerous spots in
Sarajevo. To get to the Museum, the staff had to take side streets.
To avoid sniper fire, they would have to run across Sniper's Alley,
hide behind a nearby school, and run one-by-one across another
street. Their care paid off- nobody was shot during the duration
of the war. The staff's daily activities mostly consisted of moving
the contents of the library that were directly exposed to the front
line. Because of the constant threat of sniper fire, this was
extremely dangerous. Exhibitions were moved to safer places,
further removed from the front lines.
Kaljanac says that shrapnel damaged approximately eighty
paintings during the conflict. A 1996 Parliamentary Assembly
report puts this number higher. According to this report, 97
paintings and 142 archival works were damaged by shrapnel, 215
three-dimensional objects were damaged in a break-in attempt and
97 by war action, 200 library items, and 130 documentation center
119. At the time of this interview, I did not clarify the affiliation of these
"soldiers." Most likely, these were security forces provided by the Commission
for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage.
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items were damaged (cause unspecified). 121 Shells pierced about
thirty holes in the roof of the Museum, which was not adequately
covered until 1997. Some galleries are now in very bad condition
because of water damage. In fact, the whole building is now in
rather poor physical shape. Even at the present time there is no
climate control in the building. Much of the collection remains in
storage because the conditions do not exist to properly display it.
As far as outside help, Kaljanac felt that she and the staff were
"all alone." They received no aid from UNESCO or any other
international organizations. At the time, she felt that it would have
been impossible for them to come. Her perception was that the
international community did not have much interest in the
problems of cultural institutions. Now, she thinks that more could
have been done, particularly in supplying packing and other
materials. Kaljanac points out the one exception in outside aid:
Marian Wenzel. Wenzel was a scholar of Bosnian history 2' who
was considered a great friend of Sarajevo cultural organizations.
During the conflict (as noted in the Council of Europe reports by
Colin Kaiser), she traveled to Sarajevo to speak with cultural
workers. Kaljanac remembers one show of solidarity in particular
that made a great impression on the staff: Wenzel came to the
museum wearing a bulletproof vest. When she saw that the
museum staff did not have such protection, she took hers off.
3. Zemaljski Museum - National Museum
On February 1, 1888, the National Museum of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was established.'22  Its collection focuses on
archaeology (150,000 objects), the natural sciences (over
1,000,000 objects), ethnology (material culture - 15,000 objects,
120. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. No. 7464, supra note 41, at Sec. 6.
121. Wenzel was also the head of the Bosnia-Herzegovinia Heritage Rescue
Committee, an organization that provided technical support and undertook
fundraising during the war. Colin Kaiser, Second Information Report War
Damage to the Cultural Heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, EUR.
PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. No. 6869 (1993), 26.
122. Buturovic, supra note 42, at 8.
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oral folklore - 14,000 objects), and cultural anthropology (size of
collection unknown).'23  The Museum, besides organizing
exhibitions and publishing catalogues, is also a leader in research
and scholarship.
Denana Buturovic, the current Director, began a report on the
National Museum's wartime activities by recounting a recurrent
question of those working there at the time:
is what is happening to us a reality, do the twenty of us, or
the average of fifteen that came to the Museum every day, to
this temple of millennia old civilization and cultures, whose
existence has been verified and affirmed here for more than
a century; do we really share the destiny of the bygone
civilizations, whose remnants we are merely keeping in the
Museum?' 4
For Buturovic, the actions of the staff of the National Museum
were integrally tied to this psychological shift from feeling one is a
member of a living culture to expecting that one may be on the
verge of extinction.
The National Museum was ill prepared to confront this shift.
Throughout 1991, the Museum was in poor financial shape.'25 The
staff had atrophied due to retirement, death, and the pursuit of
other opportunities. Around this time, the Public Fund for the
Culture of Bosnia and Herzegovina paid for a new alarm system
meant to dramatically improve the security of the collection.'26
The staff of the Museum had instead advocated for the purchase of
protective storage. Buturovic notes that the staff was correct in
lobbying for special cases because the alarm devices could not be
used during the war because there was no electricity.'27
The Museum staff was not prepared to work in a wartime
situation. In an October 21, 1991 letter sent to the Ministry of
123. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. No. 7464, supra note 41, at Sec. 6.
124. Buturovic, supra note 42, at 5.
125. Id. at 15.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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Education, Science, Culture, and Sports, the Museum states that it
had spent "about ten days for its preparations to work under the
eventual war conditions." 28 During this time, reports show that
discussions were held:
on the need to take the museum material outside the
Museum, on selecting the important documents and exhibits,
on preparing the material for packing, and the choice of
special aluminum-made cases - containers for storing the
selected material (moisture resistant, dust resistant, etc.).
The appropriate storage rooms in the basements were
chosen, cleaned, and painted. The experts were authorized
to select and put the most important museum material into
these rooms.'29
A major issue facing cultural organizations even before the
conflict started was the lack of available funds for war
preparations. Buturovic writes that,
none of the institutions had received the funds for such
purposes, the further development of events proved that
those who could have secured the funds, were not ready to
do so, and that those who could have taken care [of] how to
use such funds if they received any of them, did not know
how to use them, with possible minor exceptions. 3 '
While Museum departments had requested money to microfilm
inventories, such additional funds needed to be requested in 1990
(presumably because of the budget cycle) - before the outbreak of
war in the region.' At the beginning of the conflict, the City of
Sarajevo Institute for the Protection of Cultural, Historical, and
Natural Heritage warned of potential dangers and worked to create
an information system and a system for identifying cultural
128. Buturovic, supra note 42, at 15-16.
129. Id. at 16.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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property. Buturovic points out that there was "no necessary
coordination between the Republic and City Institutes charged
with protecting culture."'32 Following a Decree by the President of
Bosnia and Herzegovina entitled "The Proclamation of War in the
Republic (June 20, 1992)," it was decided to establish a Crisis
Headquarters of the National Museum of Bosnia and
Herzegovina."3 The duties of this group were to organize the work
in the institution under wartime conditions, to supervise the
removal of the most valuable exhibits, publications, documents,
and records to a safer location, and to make important decisions on
behalf of the Museum during the war.'34
More than twenty-five percent of Museum employees left their
posts (for various reasons) from the beginning of April to the
beginning of May 1992.' The remaining Museum employees
were charged with classifying and moving archives and documents
to the designated storage space. Dr. Enver Imamovic moved the
famous Sarajevo Haggadah from the Museum to a vault in the
National Bank on Sunday, June 6, 1992. In a New York Times
article by Roger Cohen, this act was described as "a Muslim
saving a Jewish manuscript stored in an old Viennese safe in the
basement of a museum built by the Austro-Hungarian Empire and
under attack from Serbian nationalists bent on destroying the
mingling of cultures and religions that is the hallmark of
Sarajevo."'36
For the removal of the Haggadah, the responsible parties in the
city hall's department of culture were consulted. Assistance was
asked for and given by the Center for Security Services Sarajevo
(CSB).'37 In a report, Prof. Dr. Imamovic wrote:
In view (of) the fact that the National Museum entered into
132. Id. at 17 n.8.
133. Id. at 25.
134. Id. at 27-28.
135. Id. at 19.
136. Roger Cohen, Where Hope Has Withered, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1995,
at Al.
137. Buturovic, supra note 42, at 20.
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the war without proper preparations, and that even the most
basic measures for the protection of treasure it had held in its
depots were not undertaken, the situation occurred that the
same treasure was absolutely not protected either from
bombing, fire or destruction, or from the theft and
devastation by the individuals and groups that went into the
Museum without control, and took over the Museum
buildings. "3
Buturovic also claims that senior museum leadership was
unwilling to act decisively to protect the collection. 9
When the war in Bosnia broke out in April 1992, internationally
approved signage (the emblem specified in the 1954 Hague
Convention) was placed on the National Museum building. A
compulsory work order was put into place on April 9, 1992.141
According to Buturovic, the Museum security services were not
reorganized to confront the threat of an increasingly hostile
environment.4 4 From April 9th to May 2nd 1992, "mass duty
service" was established in the security services department. This
service required that almost all employees of the Museum be
involved with security watches according to a prearranged
schedule. At the end of April 1992, a number of employees
involved with these watches left Sarajevo suddenly. Most of those
who left were men. 142 From May 2, 1992 (the beginning of the
fiercest fighting in the city) an ad hoc security service was put in
place. From April 1993 until the end of the conflict, the
Commission for the Protections of the Cultural Heritage carried
out security duties. 143 Members of the Croatian Defense Council
(CDC) were also stationed in the Natural Sciences Department
138. Id. at 21. Buturovic notes that the quoted report does not have a proper
protocol number in the Museum records.
139. Id. at 20.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 21.
142. Id. at 22.
143. Id. at 22-23. This was the volunteer corps of artists under the leadership
of the actor, Josip Pejakovic.
2004]
35
Kossiakoff: The Art of War: The Protection of Cultural Property during the "S
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ.ART.&ENT.LAW [Vol.XIV: 109
from March 1993. Nonetheless, there was some theft of technical
equipment during this time.
The staff improvised the protection of the exhibits and the
building.1" They attempted to seal broken exhibit cases with
available plastic and tape'45 and continued to remove the exhibits
into safe storage.'46 The Acting Director of the Museum, Dr. Rizo
Sijaric was shot and killed by sniper fire from the direction of the
Serbian position on December 6, 1993 as he attempted to secure
plastic sheeting on the damaged roof.'47 The activities of the staff
were limited by the size and weight of certain objects. For
example, the Donja Dolina boats, the centerpieces of the pre-
history collection, remained in place throughout the war. They
were protected with boards and plastic only. Thankfully, they did
not receive a direct hit. 148 Most of the collections were moved into
underground depots. While this ensured that objects were
physically safer, climate control remained a serious issue. 149
Direct attacks on the Museum building began on May 1, 1992.150
According to diaries kept by on-duty staff, shrapnel broke all the
windows, exhibits and cases were damaged, and the roof sustained
direct hits and leaked.' Along with the sustained level of attack,
inclement weather contributed to the damage. Buturovic writes,
"for a considerable period of time one could not speak about the
influx of moisture into the building, but rather, about the
uninhibited flow of water into the building."'5 2 This caused the
building and its contents to deteriorate rapidly. To worsen the
desperate state of the institution, "the entire infrastructure in the
building[s] [water supply, electrical installations, telephone lines
144. Id. at 44.
145. Id. at 33.
146. Id. at 34.
147. Id. at 25.
148. Id. at 44-45.
149. Id. at 46.
150. Id. at 29.
151. Id. at 29-33. Buturovic details the damages sustained in the early part
of the War in the chapter titled, "With Weapons Against the Museum."
152. Id. at 39.
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and central heating] was out of order throughout the war."' 53 The
roof of the Natural Sciences and Archaeology pavilions were
destroyed and were not repaired for over two years because of the
dangers to workers from snipers,5 4 problems with contractors, and
lack of funds.
The greatest outside assistance to the Museum was provided by
the city of Sarajevo. They furnished plastic sheeting, boards, nails,
and other basic supplies.'55 The Commission for the Protection of
the Cultural Heritage provided similar assistance. 6 The Patriotic
League of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Civilian Protection of
Marindvor Township assisted the Museum in 1994 and 1995 in the
evacuation of the collection to a safer location.'57 The Bosnia and
Herzegovina Heritage Rescue (BHHR) provided technical
assistance beginning in 1994. Wenzel was also one of the first
outside experts to visit Sarajevo institutions in May 1993. She was
able to instruct the staff on the protection of stec'ak (medieval
monuments) which were in the Museum's botanical garden.'58
4. The Jewish Community of Sarajevo
Jakob Finci is the President of the Jewish organization "La
Benevolencija." During the War, this organization was both a
cultural and humanitarian organization. Its work was extremely
successful, in large part because the three largest religious groups
saw it as neutral. During the war, the community'59 undertook
humanitarian work. When it became clear that these activities
were not enough to address the emotional and psychological needs
of Sarajevans, they began to organize cultural activities, which
153. Id. at 41.
154. UNPROFOR attempted, unsuccessfully, to arrange a temporary cease-
fire. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. 7464, supra note 41, at Sec. 3.
155. Buturovic, supra note 42, at 57.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 56-57.
158. Id. at48.
159. The community now numbers approximately seven hundred. See Finci,
supra note 13.
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were very well attended. In September 1992, La Benevolencija
organized "Sepharad 92," an event at the Sarajevo Holiday Inn
composed of two exhibitions, two roundtable discussions, and a
concert to commemorate the 5 0 0 th anniversary of the expulsion of
the Jews from Spain. When supplies were available, they wrote
and published a cultural bulletin in English and Bosnian and
produced a radio program. According to Finci, one of the main
problems in discussing the events of 1992 - 95 is that nobody can
figure out what to call it. Some call it the "Aggression." Others -
the "Siege." Still others, a "Civil War." However it is described,
Finci believes that cultural objects were deliberately targeted. This
was not the case during World War II. During that conflict,
mosques were only damaged collaterally. According .to Finci,
nothing was safe in Sarajevo. Cultural objects were destroyed
because they were symbols. The Jewish Cemetery, strategically
located in the military sense, served as a nest for snipers. It was
heavily mined and damaged because it was located on the front
line. In 1994 and 1995, Finci describes the situation in Sarajevo as
"an imitation of life." People spent the morning in cultural
activities (plays, exhibitions, concerts) before they went to get
their humanitarian supplies. In his opinion, "cultural activities
were a way of preserving their lifestyles." According to Finci,
UNESCO wanted cultural institutions to put up flags (the blue
shield denoting protected cultural property). "It was hard to
believe that these rules would or could be followed."
5. The Commission for the Protection of Cultural Heritage
At the beginning of the war, a volunteer force called the
Commission for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage was
formed under the initiative of actor Josip Pejakovic. Assigned to
this unit were painters, artists, and architects who joined in order
not to be drafted to the front lines. They protected storage and
provided security for cultural organizations in Sarajevo. One of
their most important tasks was to move objects to safe locations,
usually basement storage areas. This was critical not only because
the objects were further from the harm of bullets and mortar, but
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also because Sarajevo was completely looted early on of
everything of value except for books. During the first winter of
the siege, books were also taken for heat. 6° Nermina Zildzo, an
artist who joined the brigade during the War, explains her decision
to do so:
After a couple of months I left "higher" activities (so-called
'cultural resistance to war') as a nonsense that just didn't fit
war conditions and joined basic 'combat' which still seems
to me as the only reasonable thing to do. Instead of
neglecting security questions while producing new art to
look like 'civilized' victims, we chose saving what we
already had plus protecting intellectuals in various ways.
1 61
The innovative action of Pejakovic and others provided the most
effective security for cultural organizations during the war. In
addition, it potentially saved the lives of hundreds of men who
would have otherwise been drafted into combat. The effectiveness
of this organization can perhaps be credited to the fact that artists
were protecting art works. The resources of the government, given
the humanitarian crisis, needed to go to saving lives. Instead of
having an uncommitted force put in place, they allowed this
special brigade to form so that those most committed to the arts
were in charge of protecting it.
160. Id.
161. E-mail from Nermina Zildzo, to Megan Kossiakoff, author (Aug. 7,
2003, 14:59:57 EDT) (on file with author)
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V. THE ACTIONS AND EFFORTS OF UNESCO DURING THE WAR IN
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
62
UNESCO is responsible for overseeing the 1954 Hague
Convention and the 1972 World Heritage Convention. During an
armed conflict, the organization can be helpful in three ways: it
can establish control procedures for implementation of the
Convention, the Director-General can offer services to a State
Party, and a State Party can request technical cooperation from the
organization. The work of UNESCO in the Balkans was aided by
the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR), the United
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health
Organization (WHO), the United Nations Center for Human
Rights, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the European
Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), the Council of Europe,
162. Created in 1946, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is mandated in its constitution to protect
cultural heritage. Its stated mission is:
To contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among
nations through education, science, and culture in order to further
universal respect for the rule of law and for the human rights and
fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world,
without distinction of race, sex, language, or religion, by the Charter of
the United Nations.
Presently, there are 190 member states. UNESCO is composed of a General
Conference made up of member states that meet every two years to determine
policies, programs, and budget. The Executive Board, composed of 58
Members who are responsible for executing the organization's program,
recommends the appointment of a Director-General. Once selected, the
Director General, who along with his/her staff forms the Secretariat, prepares
drafts of programs, writes proposals, and formulates budgets. All of these must
be approved by the General Conference. There are five program sectors
(Education, Communications and Information, Culture, Natural Sciences, and
Social and Human Sciences) responsible for enacting UNESCO's programs. In
addition, UNESCO maintains relationships with non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and Inter-governmental Organizations (IGOs). As of
writing, there are 73 field offices, including one in Sarajevo. Bosnia and
Herzegovina became a member of UNESCO on June 2, 1992 after its
acceptance into the United Nations on May 22, 1992, UNESCO 1945-2000: A
Fact Sheet, at http://www.unesco.org (last visited July 12, 2003).
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and several non-govermental organizations (NGOs).'63
UNESCO did not have a palpable presence in Bosnia-
Herzegovina for most of the conflict because its activities were
commanded from outside the war zone. However, it recognized
early on that a cultural crisis was developing. A May 18, 1992
document began to sound alarms. It stated that "unless steps are
taken to dissuade the military forces which assault Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the world will continue to witness further tragic
devastation of mankind's cultural heritage and educational
institutions there." It is certain that the organization was aware
that cultural "devastation" had already occurred and that it would
not stop unless there was interference. To answer this crisis, an
Executive Board meeting later that month was called to discuss the
actions to be taken by UNESCO."64  The 13 9 th Session of the
Executive Board also "invited" the Director-General to send a
mission to assess the damage to culture in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
to determine the feasibility of sending assistance.'65 The Director-
General communicated this decision to Slobodan Milosevic, and
"assured him that he would spare no effort to implement [a
mission]."' 66 However, there is no doubt that effort was spared.
The fact that UNESCO would not forcefully interfere was
certainly not lost on Milosevic. This report also notes that the
Secretary-General made a request of the Commander of the United
Nations Protection Force to facilitate a UNESCO mission to
163. The Situation of the Cultural and Architectural Heritage and of
Educational and Cultural Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNESCO
Exec. Bd., 147th Sess., Annex, Prov. Agenda Item 7.5, at 5, UNESCO Doc. 147
EX/51, 28 C/45 Annex (1995).
164. The Situation of the Cultural and Architectural Heritage and of
Educational and Cultural Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNESCO
Exec. Bd., 139th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 7.5, at 2, UNESCO Doc. 139 EX/33
(1992).
165. Decisions Adopted by the Executive Board at Its 139th Session,
UNESCO Exec. Bd., Decision No. 7.5, at 32, UNESCO Doc. 139 EX/Decisions
(1992).
166. Report by the Director-General on the Implementation of 139
EX/Decision 7.5, UNESCO Exec. Bd., 140th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 8.4, at 1,
UNESCO Doc. 140 EX/25 (1992).
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Bosnia-Herzegovina. He did not think that the situation would
allow for a mission in the "immediate future."'' 67
By May 1993, approximately one year after it was called for, a
mission still had not been sent. While there seemed to be more
movement in the field of education and media projects,
UNESCO's cultural activities at this time were limited to
sponsoring a roundtable in Paris in which intellectuals, artists, and
religious leaders discussed the future of the former Yugoslavia.
61
In 1993, the organization professed "grave concern" while
"strongly condemning" those who commit acts against culture. 69
In a June 1993 letter to Dr. Colin Kaiser, Sejdalija Mustafic, the
Director of the Institute for the Protection of the Cultural-
Historical and Natural Heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina, writes
that:
Our institute regularly informed UNESCO and other
international organizations dealing with the problem of
destroying and mining cultural heritage in Bosnia and
Herzegovina from the beginning of the aggression in April
1992, on the basis of data collected in the last year.
However, we have not received any answer up to now.
Maybe, there are some problems of communication
blockades (sic.), but in any case our institute can be
contacted through the government or its ministries. 71
In their June 1993 trip to Sarajevo, fact-finders from the ECMM
found that institutions in Sarajevo wanted a special UNESCO
167. Id. at 2. It is unclear from the text of this document if "he" refers to the
Commander or the Secretary-General.
168. Report by the Director-General on the Implementation of 140
EX/Decision 8.4, UNESCO Exec. Bd., 141 Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 9.3, at 3,
UNESCO Doc. 141 EX/31 (1993).
169. The Situation of the Cultural and Architectural Heritage and of
Educational and Cultural Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNESCO
Gen. Conf., 27th Sess., Agenda Item 16.3, at 2, UNESCO Doc. 27 C/134
(1993).
170. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. No. 6904, supra note 102, App. A, at 10.
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mission in order to "obtain reliable information from occupied
areas, to help save what is remaining, particularly in Sarajevo, and
to help Bosnian experts to expand their expertise -by means of
technical advice from outside."'' It was noted in this report that
Mustafic "begged" the Council of Europe representatives to try to
find a way to get UNESCO's General Director to visit the city. He
could not come because UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali had said that "they did not have convenient circumstances"
to arrange a visit to Sarajevo. 17 2 Unfortunately, there are rarely
"convenient circumstances" in war. While waiting to send a
mission to Sarajevo, UNESCO was working with the UN
Commission of Experts on having attacks on cultural heritage
classified as war crimes.'73
The fact-finding missions that were sent through the Council of
Europe were inevitably asked the obvious question: "Why does the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) not
help?" There were several main reasons:
Cost: it is known to the UNHCR how many millions of
dollars it costs to keep Sarajevo going. Additional efforts to
help Sarajevo's cultural heritage in more positive ways are
bound to raise those sums; heavy manpower: it is generally
believed it would take more United Nations soldiers than
anyone wants to provide. In most of Europe they do not
understand the fierceness of hatred being expressed here.
This tends to make people stand back.'74
UNESCO reports frequently asserted that "destruction of the
religious and secular heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina (had)
171. Id., App. B, at 20.
172. Id. at 30.
173. Report by the Director-General on the Implementation of 141 EX
Decision 9.3, UNESCO Exec. Bd., 142nd Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 9.2, at 2,
UNESCO Doc. 142 EX/38 (1993).
The Commission of Experts was established in 1992 by Security Council
Resolution 780.
174. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. No. 6904, supra note 102, at 31.
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turned into a policy of cultural cleansing... In this war the
symbols of unity are targeted along with the symbols of cultural
specificity." '175 Given the scale and nature of the destruction,
UNESCO itself pointed out the discrepancy between its mission
and its actions. An April 1994 document says:
the international community may expect from UNESCO, as
the leading competent United Nations organization in the
field of the preservation and revival of the cultural heritage,
to launch an international campaign to safeguard historical
and archaeological properties in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
However, the provisions of resolution 11.4 of the twenty-
fourth session of the General Conference and the guidelines
in the Medium-term Plan for 1990 - 1995 and in the
Strategy for the International Safeguarding Campaign
Programme, envisage a policy of not embarking upon
additional international campaigns.'76
Instead of acting with the urgency that the wartime situation
required, UNESCO itself had to look to other international
organizations for help. While it still planned on conducting the
mission first called for in 1992,' UNESCO was limited to
developing recommendations, like the preparation of restoration
and reconstruction projects, for other organizations to carry out.'78
While they were planning on eventually coordinating restoration
work, UNESCO acted as a clearinghouse during the War. Project
proposals were passed along to potentially interested donors.'79
This allowed for a flexible, but highly decentralized, system.
When fighting decreased somewhat in the first half of 1994,
175. The Situation of the Cultural and Architectural Heritage and of
Educational and Cultural Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNESCO
Exec. Bd., 144th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 7.3, at 2, UNESCO Doc. 144 EX/34
(1994) [hereinafter UNESCO Doc. 144 EX/34].
176. Id.
177. See UNESCO Exec. Bd., 139 EX/Decisions, supra note 165.
178. UNESCO Doc. 144 EX/34, supra note 175, at 2.
179. Eur. Pan. Assemb. Doc. No. 7133, supra note 22, at Sec. C.
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UNESCO was finally able to send missions into the area. The idea
of opening a UNESCO field office in Sarajevo was discussed in a
May 3, 1994 meeting with Bosnian government officials. 8 A set
of priorities for the UNESCO office was established which
included rehabilitation programs, dispatching emergency
conservation supplies, the organization of training workshops for
specialists, and the sponsorship of media events to draw attention
to the organization's efforts to protect Bosnia-Herzegovina's
heritage."18
In the middle of 1994, the Director-General's Special Adviser to
the former Yugoslavia traveled to Sarajevo and Mostar to assess
the damage. During this visit, the Minister of Education and
Culture expressed the government's wish that UNESCO and the
Council of Europe would focus their energies on protecting the
culture of Bosnia-Herzegovina (as a whole) and restore
monuments of "great symbolic value."!82 Beginning in April 1994,
UNESCO and UNPROFOR sponsored a "cultural airlift" that
allowed for cultural exchanges of artists, researchers, and scientists
to and from Sarajevo.'83 In March 1994, it should be noted, the
European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) began to
monitor cultural heritage as a matter of Standard Operating
Procedure (SOP). This arrangement allowed the ECMM to gather
information on the cultural heritage and pass it on to local
religious, political, and heritage authorities.'84 Unlike
UNPROFOR, the ECMM was willing to facilitate the safe travel
180. This office opened in September 1994. Before this time, it seems that
there was only a UNESCO representative in the region. The Situation of the
Cultural and Architectural Heritage as well as of Educational and Cultural
Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNESCO Exec. Bd., 146th Sess., Prov.
Agenda Item 7.1, at 42, UNESCO Doc. 146 EX/32 (1995).
181. The Situation of the Cultural and Architectural Heritage as well as of
Educational and Cultural Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNESCO
Exec. Bd., 14 5th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 8.2, at 4-5, UNESCO Doc. 145
EX/36 (1994).
182. Id. at 2-3.
183. Id. at 3. A short recap of UNESCO's actions can be found on pages 42-
43 of this report.
184. Eur. Parl. Assemb., Doc. No. 7133, supra note 105, at Sec. A.
2004]
45
Kossiakoff: The Art of War: The Protection of Cultural Property during the "S
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ.ART.&ENT.LAW [Vol.XIV: 109
of consultants gathering information around the country. The
ECMM was the only international organization that attempted to
monitor the heritage in the former Yugoslavia during the
conflict." 5
UNESCO was most active during the last months of the war. In
May 1995, it was reported that two subcontracts had been secured
for emergency repairs to the National Museum and other city
monuments. Financial support for a training workshop in
restoration was provided with the assistance of the Council of
Europe. Donations of material and equipment were being sent to
several cultural institutions.'86 In October 1995, an agreement was
made to reopen the Sarajevo field office, which had closed for
safety reasons, and re-establish a UNESCO presence in the region.
In an October 28, 1995 report of the General Conference, the
Executive Board made requests to the Director-General to provide
technical and financial aid to publish collected information on the
damage to the cultural heritage in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in addition
to providing "moral and financial support" to cultural activities.'87
Additional activities at the end of 1995 included preparing files
necessary to nominate Mostar and Sarajevo to the World Heritage
List, organizing programs for artists in collaboration with the
German-Bosnian Society, providing assistance for the most urgent
repairs on the National and University Library, the National
185. Tenth Information Report on War Damage to the Cultural Heritage in
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. No. 7740, Sec. 1
(1997), at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http%3A%2F%2Fassembly.coe.int%2FD
ocuments%2FWorkingDocs%2FDoc97%2FEDOC7740.htm. To facilitate
finding these sources in the future, Council of Europe documents that were
accessed from the Internet will give the section number, rather than the page
reference.
186. The Situation of the Cultural and Architectural Heritage and of
Educational and Cultural Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNESCO
Exec. Bd., 146th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 9.3, at 3-4, UNESO Doc. 146 EX/46
(1995).
187. The Situation of the Cultural and Architectural Heritage and
Educational and Cultural Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNESCO
Gen. Conf., 28th Sess., at 2, UNESCO Doc. 28 C/45 (1995).
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Theater, the Historical Museum, the Academy of Fine Arts, the
National Museum, and the Music Academy, delivering supplies
and materials into Sarajevo, and beginning to look into violations
of the 1954 Hague Convention.'88
UNESCO is charged with the protection of cultural property in
its mission and its constitution. Therefore, its failure to intervene
on behalf of culture is far less excusable than the inaction of other,
smaller international organizations. In Article 23 of the 1954
Hague Convention, it is stated that High Contracting Parties can
approach UNESCO for help and the organization "shall accord
such assistance within the limits fixed by its program and by its
resources."' 89  UNESCO can do little in the way of assistance
without the support of member states and the United Nations
hierarchy. Not intervening or offering assistance when approached
seems to be a breach of both the mission of UNESCO and the
spirit (though not the letter, because resources were not available)
of the Hague Convention. Because it is an international
organization subject to the political pressures of its member states,
it cannot act as independently as a private organization like the
Red Cross can. It is clear from the actions of the belligerent
parties in this case that there was little fear that UNESCO would
exert pressure on them to cease their destruction.
VI. ACTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
There is an "astonishing lack of will on the part of the
international community with respect to the defense of the cultural
heritage of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or even to imagining
what its future could be when the fighting stops."' 90
In interviews, cultural leaders in Sarajevo made it clear that they
believed that the international community, and the world at large,
188. The Situation of the Cultural and Architectural Heritage and of
Educational and Cultural Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNESCO
Exec. Bd., 146th Sess., Annex, Prov. Agenda Item 8.12, at 7-8, UNESCO Doc.
147 EX/51, 28 C/45 Annex (1995).
189. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 5, 249 U.N.T.S. at art. 23.1.
190. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doe. 6904., supra note 102, at 9.
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did not care about their plight and that psychological support
would have made a significant difference in validating the work
that they were risking their lives to do. With a few notable
exceptions like the Council of Europe Monitoring Mission and the
Bosnia-Herzegovina Heritage' Rescue Committee, the aid provided
by international organizations was reactive, not proactive. It
focused on rehabilitating severely damaged and well-known sites,
such as Stari Most in Mostar (Herzegovina) and the historical
center of Dubrovnik, Croatia. As stated in a Council of Europe
report, "international cultural organizations are not equipped - in
the widest sense of the term - for functioning in wartime."'91 The
most significant problem is that there is not an infrastructure in
place or the competence available to address the needs of this type
of very difficult and politically sensitive situation. During the
Balkan Wars, several international organizations were notable for
their involvement. 192 However, taken together, these efforts are a
hodgepodge and do not necessarily complement each other in their
effectiveness. The lack of an oversight structure for outside aid in
the former Yugoslavia led to the appearance of 'carpet-baggers'-
people who came to "help" for their own enrichment.'93
Legitimate international organizations faced two daunting
challenges to operating in the area during the war: attaining
accurate information regarding the extent of the damage and
guaranteeing safety for personnel. Amassing reliable information
was particularly difficult in the early period of the War after the
communications infrastructure was destroyed. Outside
191. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB., Doc. 6756, supra note 7, at 31.
192. For example, the ARCH Foundation (Switzerland) developed a mobile
conservation center and stressed the importance of practical aid while the war
was ongoing. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Heritage Rescue UK was critical in
compiling information on damage to cultural sites. The Society for the
Protection of Ancient Buildings (UK) sponsored an initiative called "Operation
Tarpaulin" for roofing supplies and provided a pamphlet on "First Aid Repair to
War-Damaged Buildings." The World Monuments Fund (US) published
articles on cultural damage. See Colin Kaiser, Second Information Report War
Damage to the Cultural Heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, EUR.
PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. No. 6869, supra note 121, at 18-27.
193. Id. at 26-28.
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organizations were frequently forced to rely on local sources of
questionable reliability. The information that was received was
often not available for outside verification because of the
impossibility of accessing the sites.'94
Compounding these difficulties was the fact that the media did
very little to publicize the destruction of the cultural heritage in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to Kaiser, "the foreign media
were certainly of no effectiveness during the Balkan Wars with
respect to the protection of cultural heritage."'95  This lack of
attention to the critical situation in Bosnia contrasts with the flood
of activity in response to the shelling of Dubrovnik in Croatia.
Shortly after the attack on this city, UNESCO put forth $200,000
and the World Heritage Committee donated $50,000.196 The same
expert aid and financial support was absent from Bosnia during
most of the War.
The second major area of concern was safety, especially during
travel. As mentioned earlier, even UNESCO was forced to place a
moratorium on missions to Bosnia from the beginning of hostilities
in 1992 until the middle of 1994.'9' The absence of meaningful
international assistance was duly noted by cultural organizations.
Had they been in the war zone, neutral outside observers could
have confirmed damage reports, performed some degree of
arbitration between opposing forces, and advocated the
preservation of culture.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
It was hoped that, after looking at the experience of protecting
cultural property in a case like Sarajevo, that there would be a
clear indication of what must be done to stop such destruction next
time. And, in fact, what needs to happen is obvious. A "Golden
Rule" for cultural heritage must be adopted: "Do unto other's
culture as you'd have done unto yours." Of course, it is not
194. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. 6756, supra note 7, at 32.
195. E-mail from Colin Kaiser, supra note 8.
196. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. 6869, supra note 192, at 18.
197. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. 6756, supra note 7, at 31.
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realistic to expect this to happen because "people fighting wars are
psychologically in very tight boxes: they perceive only the present
and not the future."'98 Although it is unrealistic to expect that no
cultural property will be purposely destroyed during a conflict,
there is no doubt that more can be done to preserve it. If the
international community asserts that cultural property belongs to
all humankind and nothing is done to protect it, then all are guilty
of neglect and inaction. Each conflict is different, but the needs of
the heritage are generally the same. There are simple, and not
necessarily expensive, actions that could make a significant
difference. The following recommendations are examples of
improvements that can practicably be made considering the current
reality of protection.
A. Recommendations
At the present time the international community seems to be
falling back on routine notions of international cultural co-
operation without being able to come to grips with the size and
significance of the disaster that continues to spread.'99
1. Legal Protection of Cultural Property
"The effectiveness of international law ultimately depends on
the principle of universal acceptance.""2 ° If one side of a conflict is
not a State Party to the Convention, it is essentially useless. For
this reason, it is necessary to encourage as many nations as
possible to accede to the Hague Convention. As of the summer of
2003, 105 nations have ratified the Convention. Although this is a
significant number, it is still limited, particularly if one considers
that the United States and the United Kingdom have not done so.2"'
198. E-mail from Colin Kaiser, supra note 8.
199. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. 6756, supra note 7, at 10.
200. Boylan, supra note 17, at 8.
201. The United States is a signatory of the 1954 Hague Convention.
However, ratification was delayed because of Cold War concerns about being
bound to the Convention in the event of a nuclear war. President Clinton
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In addition, many Contracting Parties have made little effort to
educate their citizens about the importance - much less the
substance - of the 1954 Hague Convention. It does little good to
ratify the agreement without communicating the ideas conveyed
by it to the public.20 2
So far, the 1954 Hague Convention has largely served a
symbolic purpose. It affirms that the international community, in
theory, accepts the universal value of cultural heritage and its
importance to national identity. On the practical level, though, the
Convention has been ineffective. One reason for this is that the
legal protections currently in place are not designed to address the
realities of modern-day warfare. Now terrorist attacks, wars of
liberation, and guerilla actions are more common than traditionally
envisioned conflicts like World War II. In these situations, the
rule of law cannot realistically be expected to prevail, particularly
if there is no state to be held accountable. If applied to the
situations for which it was intended, the Hague Convention likely
would make a difference in the level of destruction. It is now
necessary to consider how to encompass these more modern types
of conflict into international law.
Whether the 1999 Second Protocol, which will take effect in
March 2004,23 will brace some of the Convention's weaknesses
remains to be seen. It does clarify the vague concepts of
"peacetime preparation," "Special Protection," and "military
necessity" that were so ambiguous in the original Convention.
With more concrete definitions of these ideas, the excuse of
confusion will be less available. The 1999 Second Protocol also
"develops humanitarian law by defining serious violations and by
extending the scope of application to non-international
conflicts. ' '2 4 In addition, it expands the jurisdictional reach of the
original Convention by specifying that violations will be subject to
forwarded the Convention to the Senate with a recommendation for ratification
in 1999. It is still waiting in committee. See Colwell-Chantaphonh & Piper,
supra note 9.
202. Boylan, supra note 17, at 43.
203. See supra note 77.
204. Henckaerts, supra note 78.
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penalties under relevant international law.205
However, the Second Protocol will make little difference in
cultural property protection if enforcement and implementation
continue to remain such low priorities. First, practical steps for
strengthening the reach of the Hague Convention can be taken,
including communicating its importance to the public and cultural
professionals, as well as funding peacetime preparation. To make
the preparation process less daunting, UNESCO should inform its
member states about the expectations and requirements of the
Hague Convention and the Second Protocol. Implementation
efforts must be communicated and closely monitored. This
process could be moved along with the aid of an advisory
committee, like the Committee of the Blue Shield.
While little was done in the legal realm to protect the cultural
heritage during the Balkan Wars, there are some promising post-
conflict developments. Charges have been filed against Slobodan
Milosevic and the commanders of the military units that destroyed
the historical center of Dubrovnik."6 The enforcement of the legal
regulations concerning cultural property sends a message that this
type of action will not go unpunished - at least in the most
egregious cases.
2. Linking Cultural and Humanitarian Aid
The argument should be made more strongly that cultural aid is
an extension of humanitarian assistance. "Taking part in a war is a
humiliating, soul-destroying experience, even if you are pretty sure
of your cause.""2 7 Protecting the cultural symbols of a people can
give them psychological and emotional strength, and serves as a
form of resistance.
To implement this link, "the protection of the cultural heritage
should always be clearly included in the tasks of UN Peace-
205. Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 81, at art.
16.
206. For updates on these criminal proceedings, see http://www.icty.org.
207. E-mail from Colin Kaiser, supra note 7.
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Keeping Missions as part of humanitarian aid. 2 °8 Peacekeeping
forces and humanitarian aid organizations can also collaborate
with the cultural sector within strict criteria: evacuation of
movable property in critical situations, emergency stabilization of
dangerous structures, and protection and weatherproofing of
damaged structures. 219 "Very operational organizations (UNHCR,
its implementing partners, and international military forces with
engineering expertise) should help out with this kind of assistance,
with advice from UNESCO or the Blue Shield. 210  The most
urgent needs of cultural organizations are generally the most
inexpensive and low-tech forms of protection: plastic sheeting,
sand bags, and packing materials. By providing these in advance,
damage from the elements will be greatly lessened. While there is
often very little foresight into these types of issues, it must be
pointed out that prevention is much easier and cheaper than
rebuilding and restoration. Once damage occurs, objects are often
left to wait for expert attention, which exposes them to even more
harm.
3. UNESCO
UNESCO is trying to do too much, and thus, ends up doing too
little. Not only is it responsible to the cultural community, but also
to the scientific, educational, and journalistic ones, as well. In the
wars in the former Yugoslavia, the organization was unable to
fulfill its mission on behalf of culture. Without the active
participation and support of member states, this is unlikely to
change. What UNESCO can do, then, is use its network to assist
208. Resolution on Information as an Instrument for Protection against War
Damages to the Cultural Heritage, Resolution adopted at an expert meeting
convened by the Swedish Central Board of National Antiquities, the Swedish
National Commission for UNESCO and ICOMOS Sweden, (June 10, 1994) at
http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/sweden/html-eng/pagel.shtml (last visited
Dec. 8, 2002). This recommendation, of course, only applies if peacekeepers
are present.
209. E-mail from Colin Kaiser, supra note 7.
210. Id.
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organizations that are better equipped and more willing to operate
in war zones. Putting pressure on the broader United Nations
organization to include cultural heritage monitors on peacekeeping
operations should be made a priority because access to accurate
information is so critical."' It should also push its member states
to prepare themselves for any potential disaster by preparing
publications."' One example would be a handbook of practical
and creative solutions for dealing with potential damage during a
conflict or natural disaster. This book should build on the
experience of cultural workers in past conflicts and the advice of
experts in the field. It could be commissioned by a large
international organization like UNESCO with input from NGOs
and arts professionals."' An "expert" database should also be
created with the assistance of organizations like ICOM
(International Council of Museums), ICCROM (International
Center for the Study of Preservation and Restoration of Cultural
Property), ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and
Sites), and AAM (American Association of Museums). 4
UNESCO should prepare a comprehensive database of cultural
property to be protected before the outbreak of war, using its
existing records and those of the World Heritage Committee. This
would make the monitoring of damage much easier. UNESCO
can help States compile lists of cultural property that would
qualify for inclusion.2"5 This list must be shared with warring
parties and all UNESCO member states so that the situation can be
monitored in a very public way. The argument that the location of
important cultural property should be kept secret for security
reasons should finally be dismissed. The experience in Bosnia
shows that a hostile party already knows where hidden property is,
or at the very least, can easily find out. The best hope for saving
211. Boylan, supra note 17, at 135.
212. Id. at 128-29.
213. Id. at 129.
214. Id. at 141-42. Boylan advocates a more prominent role for non-
governmental organizations in his Review. This is one example of how these
organizations can be of more assistance.
215. Toman, supra note 15, at 117.
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cultural property is to clearly identify and monitor it so that there
can be no mistakes or "accidents." "Ne'V technology, such as the
Global Positioning Systems (GPS), can also be helpful in this
task.2 6 An organization like UNESCO, with its vast network of
fellow United Nations organizations is ideally situated to act as
both a databank and clearinghouse.
4. The International Community
There are two aspects of international involvement that must be
addressed: the actions of international organizations and the more
localized efforts of cultural professionals. Both groups can work
together to educate the public on the issues involved with cultural
destruction, raise awareness of its effects, and develop a brain trust
(in association with UNESCO) that is uniquely positioned to deal
with these types of challenges. The most crucial step to effective
international action is the establishment of a strong, non-
governmental organization that has as its mission the specific goal
of protecting cultural heritage during emergency situations. 17
Integration is key. The experience in Bosnia clearly shows that
organizations within a governmental structure, whether national or
international, cannot be as effective in their interactions because of
political risks and a perceived lack of neutrality.218 Furthermore, it
is politically difficult for an outside state to get involved in
conflicts that are not directly related to the interests of its citizens.
The intervention of non-governmental organizations that can more
easily navigate tricky political situations is therefore necessary. 9
The growth of the Swedish group, Cultural Heritage Without
Borders, should be nurtured and supported so that an infrastructure
for this type of action can be put in place.
216. Parks, supra note 21, at 7.
217. This could include both conflict and natural disasters.
218. The exception to this was the Council of Europe, which took
tremendous risks to gather information and produce reports on cultural
destruction. The organization provided resources and backing to undertake this
endeavor, which is not usually the case.
219. See Boylan, supra note 17, at 141.
1632004]
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To develop this, the cultural community needs to look to other
organizations designed to assist in acute humanitarian disasters.
Therefore, the development and strengthening of an organization
based on the model of "Doctors Without Borders" would be
effective. While it was founded too late (1996) to be of assistance
during the war in the former Yugoslavia, a recent positive
development in cultural heritage protection is the establishment of
the International Committee of the Blue Shield - the "Red Cross of
cultural heritage." This non-governmental organization was
developed by ICA (the International Council of Archives), ICOM
(International Council of Museums), ICOMOS (International
Council on Monuments and Sites), and IFLA (International
Federation of Library Associations and Institutions). It took an
active role in the development of the Second Protocol to the 1954
Hague Convention and works to respond to the challenges of war
and natural disasters with expertise and manpower.
"International organizations usually do not work well together
unless there is a strong government to make them coordinate. 22 °
The experience in Bosnia shows that a national government that is
weak and in chaos will be of little help to cultural organizations.
While it would certainly need the blessing and operational
assistance of the government, an outside, independent body should
take on the task of coordination. The organization charged with
protecting cultural property during conflict has quite a task ahead
of it. It must ensure the safety of neutral cultural observers,
prioritize protection and reconstruction projects, promote expert
exchanges, provide disaster relief, coordinate the efforts of various
cooperating organizations, and facilitate the flow of accurate
information, particularly in the preparation of standardized damage
reports. The organization must also be able to collect data and
communicate for institutions that do not have phone or electrical
service. In addition, it is critical that international relief efforts are
not only focused on the best-known sites. The over-concentration
of resources on well-known symbols subtracts from the attention
given to the smaller organizations and sites that are extremely
220. E-mail from Colin Kaiser, supra note 7.
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important to the community.2 '
While cultural and governmental institutions in Bosnia-
Herzegovina could have been better prepared and organized, they
did not have the means to communicate their situation to the
outside world because of the lack of phone and electrical service.
This is one area in which international organizations and the media
could have been extremely effective. By drawing attention to the
situation of cultural organizations, there might not only have been
the promise of additional aid, but also the possibility that such
notice would have put pressure on belligerent forces.
5. Outside Cultural Organizations
It was possible to help during the war, and much more should
have been done by the international museum community to help
museums protect their collections. Museums have perhaps been
the worst-assisted (of cultural organizations) by their fellow
professionals outside Bosnia of all cultural institutions in the
country during the war - musicians, artists, and academics have all
received support.222
A largely untapped resource in the fight to save the heritage is
the large, and generally well-connected, network of cultural
professionals throughout the world. Besides providing expert
advice, arts professionals and international organizations could
launch campaigns to help endangered sites within their own
communities. Within every cultural organization is the mission to
educate the public. To fulfill this mission, organizations can
sponsor programming related to cultural property issues at their
institutions. In addition, there is now the ability to use the Internet
and professional global connections to educate and advocate.
Bringing attention to lesser-known sites is a particularly urgent
task. In addition, the Internet could be used as an outside
clearinghouse for emergency and reconstruction projects-if its
use was well supervised by a central organization.
221. Eur. Parl. Assemb. Doc. 6904, supra note 102, at 9.
222. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. 7464, supra note 41, at 5.
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Most of all, outside cultural professionals can provide support
for colleagues confronting seemingly impossible situations. All of
the cultural leaders interviewed stated that psychological support
from the outside world would have made a significant emotional
difference for them. Cultural professionals in war zones are often
completely cut-off from. professional networks because of
communication difficulties. As a Council of Europe report notes,
"On a national and regional level, a community of knowledge has
been fragmented whose shattering will have serious consequences
for research and scholarship in the region unless relationships are
rebuilt." '223 After a conflict, making contact and rebuilding those
networks will help in normalizing the postwar situation and ending
the isolation. Just one example of how this can be done is by
collecting professional journals so that cultural professionals can
catch-up with the latest developments after hostilities have
ended.224
6. Staff of Cultural Organizations
Much of the real preservation of cultural property is done "on
the ground" by institutional employees. It is critical that they are
prepared for the psychological and professional challenges that
will need to be faced during armed conflict. While UNESCO and
national governments can provide training materials, it is essential
that cultural organizations take the initiative to prepare themselves.
The experience of cultural workers in Sarajevo proves that no one
believes that this type of situation could happen. Indeed, the
biggest block to peacetime preparation is psychological. Some of
the interview subjects said that an advanced plan would have made
little difference because conditions were not in place to allow them
to execute it. However, it must be argued that thinking about and
preparing an emergency plan can do no harm. There will be
realities that must be faced. Staff members of cultural institutions
operating in a war situation are likely going to be very dedicated to
223. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. 7740, supra note 171, at 19.
224. EUR. PARL. ASSEMB. Doc. 7464, supra note 171, at Sec. 5.
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their work as preserving the heritage is seen as a form of
resistance. Unfortunately, it is inevitable that there will be .a loss
of staff (through access difficulties, illness, death, fleeing, etc.)
during a conflict. There will likely not be funds available for
salaries or basic projects. Institutions will need to depend on the
dedication of volunteers.
Even if a wartime situation is not conceivable, much of the
damage that occurs during a conflict is the result of very
imaginable events - flood, fire, or other* natural disaster.
According to Boylan's Review of the Hague Convention:
In terms of their impact on buildings and collections a high
proportion of the actual damage that occurs in war is not
very different from that resulting from natural or civil
disasters. Direct parallels between the effects of war damage
and those of civil or natural disasters include: fire, structural
collapse of roofs and walls, ingress of water whether through
holes in roofs or from damaged building services,
interruption of essential services, especially gas (leading to
fire and explosion and loss of heating), surface drainage
(resulting in flooding), and electricity (with consequent shut-
down of building services, such as air conditioning, security,
and information systems), and criminal acts against cultural
property, such as casual theft, more extensive and organized
looting and vandalism. 25
Considering the types of issues beforehand can be extremely
helpful for those who might, unfortunately, have to care for
collections under these circumstances. At the very least, a
discussion about proper storage and security must take place.
Collections will likely need to stay in storage during a conflict and
for some time afterwards while repairs are made. For this reason,
adequate conditions are essential. Once in storage, collections will
be more vulnerable to moisture, ventilation, and temperature
problems--especially if the storage is temporary. These concerns
225. Boylan, supra note 17, at 70.
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need to be thought out ahead of time.
As the experience of cultural organizations in Sarajevo showed,
high tech alarm systems cannot be counted on to function during
times of conflict or natural disaster. If the galleries and storage are
not adequately protected, it is almost certain that there will be theft
and looting. Real security will need to be provided by real people.
The formation of the Commission for the Protection of the
Cultural Heritage is a unique and extremely effective example of
how special security forces can be developed. Besides providing
security at no cost to cultural institutions, this service saved the
lives of hundreds who would otherwise have been sent into a
combat situation, and allowed them to participate in resistance
activities that were suited to their particular competence.
The system of cultural property protection must continue to
evolve to confront present realities. However, many of the
challenges faced during war will remain the same in the future.
Focusing on very practical aspects of protection, such as technical
support and information gathering, will ensure that cultural
property is safeguarded until the international legal instruments are
better enforced and more effective.
The experience of Sarajevo during the War proved that cultural
heritage represented much more than artistic achievement.
Instead, it was the expression of a tolerant, multi-ethnic tradition
that belligerent troops felt needed to be destroyed in order to
envision a mono-ethnic future. In this way, the destruction of
cultural property was an aspect of the larger ethnic cleansing
campaign. During the War, the elimination of the Muslims
"included an attempt to erase any memory of their linkage to the
land, not least as a means to help ensure that ethnic cleansing was
irreversible." '226 Preserving the past is an act of resistance for those
faced with the threat of "elimination," and a rebuke to those who
wish to rewrite history. It is really about protecting people by
preserving their connections and roots. In essence, cultural
property protection is a way of declaring that the highest human
226. NORMAN CIGAR, GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA: THE POLICY OF "ETHNIC
CLEANSING," 48 (1995).
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values of life and respect cannot be wiped away - even with
artillery shells.
Megan Kossiakoff
* Currently a student at the DePaul University College of Law, the author
received her BA in Russian and Eastern European History from Stanford
University in 1998, and her MA in Arts Administration from the School of the
Art Institute of Chicago in 2003. The idea for this article came when the author
was working as an exhibitions researcher at the Spertus Museum and had to
obtain permission to use an image of the Sarajevo Haggadah from the National
Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fascinated with the story of how the
Haggadah was saved during the War in the former Yugoslavia, she decided to
travel to Sarajevo and interview museum directors and cultural leaders. This
article, which is based on a previously-completed Master's Thesis, is the result
of her research. The author would like to thank Maureen Collins, Michael Dorf,
Jacob Finci, Dr. Patty Gerstenblith, Meliha Husedzinovic, Colin Kaiser, Muhiba
Kaljanac, Anthony and Susan Kossiakoff, Barry Szczesny, Christine Weber,
Nermina Zildzo, and Jaime Davids for their input and encouragement during the
writing of this article. This study would not have been possible without the help
of Asja Mandic of ARS AEVI who felt this project important enough to arrange
interviews, provide interpretation, and smuggle books out of libraries.
61
Kossiakoff: The Art of War: The Protection of Cultural Property during the "S
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
170 DEPAULJ.ART. &ENT.LAW [Vol.XIV: 109
62
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol14/iss1/5
